This study examines an alternative approach to measuring accounting quality. Taking a neoclassical view of the audit market, we argue that unexplained audit fees should capture a firm's accounting quality. We develop a comprehensive model of audit fee determinants to estimate unexplained audit fees, which are then used to measure firms' accounting quality. We compare our measure to existing measures and show that unexplained audit fees correlate positively with other empirical measures while also conveying new information. Our primary tests examine whether unexplained audit fees are predictive of fraud and restatements, and associated with the amount of future earnings captured in stock returns, measured using the forward earnings-response coefficient. We find unexplained audit fees are incrementally informative to accruals quality in both settings. We also show that our measure is less associated with innate firm characteristics than measures based on realized earnings, making it a good candidate for studies examining the economic consequences of accounting quality. We discuss the implications of our findings for future research.
I. Introduction
This study presents a new approach to measuring accounting quality. Economic theory suggests that in a competitive equilibrium, audit fees incorporate the expected cost of poor quality earnings. Auditors face significant reputation and litigation risk if their client's financial reports are misstated. In response, auditors can use their access to management, knowledge of firm operations, and past experience to identify firms that provide low quality accounting information. The additional risk associated with poor quality accounting systems should therefore be priced into the audit. Consequently, isolating this part of the audit fees provides a summary measure of the auditor's assessment of the quality of the accounting system. Our approach uses a regression to remove the portion of audit fees that is explained by known determinants, and uses the unexplained fees as a measure of accounting quality.
The primary goal of our research is to develop an alternative to existing models of earnings quality that are based on realized earnings (e.g., Dechow and Dichev 2002; Francis et al. 2004) . We adopt the perspective that auditors are in the best position to provide an ex-ante assessment of a firm's accounting quality, and will price differences in accounting quality into the fees charged to the client. By developing an ex-ante measure of accounting quality, our intent is to capture expected differences in quality that do not necessarily manifest themselves in realized earnings. We expect our measure to complement existing measures that use realized earnings and earnings components.
There are several attractive features to an audit-fee based measure of accounting quality.
First, auditors have inside knowledge of firms' operations and how the financial reporting captures those operations. Although the audit opinion itself contains very little information, the fees charged by the auditor should reflect the auditor's assessment of the quality of the underlying accounting system, irrespective of whether the firm receives a clean opinion. Thus, an audit-fee-based measure of earnings quality summarizes the auditor's unobservable private information about accounting quality, which potentially captures more information than measures of accounting quality that are based on realized financial statement data.
Second, unexplained audit fees capture a broader measure of accounting quality than measures focusing on one aspect of accounting quality, such as accrual quality. The risk of misstatement that auditors are exposed to refers to a material misstatement in any part of the financial statements (e.g., income statement, balance sheet, and notes to the financial statements).
A measure based on unexplained audit fees therefore provides a more global assessment of financial statement quality than focusing exclusively on one facet of accounting quality, such as how well accruals map into cash flows.
Third, an important issue with measures of accounting quality based on realized earnings is that they capture operating risk in addition to accounting quality (e.g., Liu and Wysocki 2007) .
This issue provides a significant hurdle to research linking accounting quality to economic constructs, such as asset pricing or investment efficiency, because the researcher has to convincingly rule out the known association between innate firm characteristics. An audit-fee based measure should be less confounded by these innate characteristics, because auditors bear the risk that financial statements are materially misstated, not the operating risk of the firm itself.
For example, if the auditor's client is not likely to continue as a going concern then the auditor can issue a going concern opinion and require the financial statements to reflect that fact. The risk that auditors have to price is the risk that the financial statements do not reflect the operating risk of the client, not the client's operating risk itself.
1 Thus, a measure of accounting quality based on audit fees should be less confounded by innate firm characteristics.
We use prior research to develop a comprehensive model of audit fee determinants.
We define unexplained audit fees as the residual from a regression of total audit fees on the identified determinants, and use this as our measure of accounting quality. We exclude financial statement-based measures of accounting quality in the audit fee regression to allow us to determine the extent to which our audit-fee-based measure correlates with other empirically derived measures of accounting quality. We also expand the traditional model of audit fee determinants to include both internal and external measures of corporate governance, predicting that lower levels of corporate governance leads to increased reputation and litigation risk for auditors.
After estimating unexplained audit fees (UAF) for our sample, we compare the estimates to other empirical measures of accounting quality, including: Dechow and Dichev's (2002) measure of accrual quality (AQ), the absolute value of discretionary accruals, earnings smoothness, and book-tax differences. If unexplained audit fees is a comprehensive measure of accounting quality, it should be associated with existing measures of earnings quality, but provide additional information. We show that UAF is significantly associated with each of these measures, both unconditionally, and conditional on the other measures, although the magnitude of the correlations are fairly modest. Thus, although there is some commonality across the measures, there is also unique information embedded in the UAF measure.
Our primary tests examine whether unexplained audit fees are predictive of accounting frauds and restatements, and associated with the market's ability to predict future earnings.
1 While unexplained audit fees is theoretically not a function of operating risk it is possible that these two measures are correlated and, therefore, we control for operating risk in our empirical tests.
Because the Dechow and Dichev AQ measure has been used extensively to test the economic implications of accounting quality (e.g., Francis et al. 2005; Biddle, Hilary, Verdi 2008) , we compare the performance of unexplained audit fees to accruals quality in these settings.
The settings we use to test the efficacy of our measure of accounting quality are based on the decision-usefulness role of financial accounting, which FASB considers to be the overriding criterion for judging accounting choice (Schipper and Vincent 2003, citing Concepts Statement No. 2). Our first setting examines the extent to which unexplained audit fees are incrementally predictive of accounting restatements, accounting fraud, and regulatory investigations related to restatements. 2 Our second setting examines the extent to which each measure captures the market's ability to anticipate future earnings, using the forward earnings-response coefficient.
Our results show that conditional on each other, both AQ and UAF are predictive of accounting restatements. When predicting fraudulent restatements, however, only UAF is statistically significant. We further find the amount of future earnings information embedded in price is positively associated with accounting quality measured using UAF. In contrast, there is no association between AQ and the amount of future earnings information embedded in returns.
Taken together, our findings suggest that unexplained audit fees are a useful summary measure of accounting quality. Moreover, using audit fee data provides new information about accounting quality that is not included in other existing measures.
Finally, we examine the extent to which each measure of quality is confounded by innate firm characteristics, which can limit the attribution of causality in research examining the economic consequences of financial reporting quality. We show that a measure of accounting quality derived from audit fees is significantly less associated with size, operating volatility, frequency of losses, and length of operating cycle, which reduces the threat of omitted variables driving any documented association between UAF and other variables. In an econometric sense, it is a good instrument for measuring the unobservable construct of 'accounting quality', because it is correlated with the construct of interest, but uncorrelated with many of the confounding variables.
We believe our measure adds to the extensive literature estimating financial reporting quality. By developing an audit-fee based measure of accounting quality, we broaden the set of information being used by researchers to determine accounting quality. Given the contentious findings that attempt to link financial reporting quality to important economic consequences such as resource allocation and asset pricing, we believe researchers can use our measure to help validate or refute the role of financial reporting quality in these other settings. show that higher quality reporting mitigates both over-and under-investment, and show firms with better AQ measures deviate less from predicted investment levels.
II. Prior Literature and Research Design

Measures of accounting quality
In addition to AQ, various other empirical measures have been used to capture aspects of accounting quality. These measures include the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABS(DA)) calculated using a cross-sectional version of the modified Jones model; earnings smoothness measured as the ratio of income variability to cash flow variability; and book-tax differences (e.g., Becker et al. 1998; Phillips et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2005) . Similar to AQ, these measures have been used in a variety of contexts, which are too numerous to list here.
A common thread throughout all of these measures is that they tend to be based on realized earnings, and earnings components. As such, they provide an ex-post measure of earnings quality, based on earnings realizations. Moreover, they are often constructed to measure the quality of reported earnings or accruals, but not necessarily the quality of the entire accounting system. To complement these measures, we develop a measure of accounting quality that does not rely on realized financial statement data, instead using the market for audits to provide an indicator of accounting quality.
Audit Fee Research
Our measure of accounting quality uses the fees charged by auditors to infer the auditor's ex-ante assessment of the quality of the accounting system. Our approach builds from the premise that lower quality accounting systems increase the risk exposure of auditors, and therefore will be priced in equilibrium. Moreover, auditors are arguably in the best position to estimate the quality of the accounting system because of their proprietary information and access to management.
Using proprietary data, past research demonstrated that auditors increase their total audit fees for clients with high inherent risk of material misstatement (O'Keefe, Suminic, and Stein 1994; Bell, Landsman, and Shackelford 2001) . Having access to proprietary audit partner assessments of risk, both studies find an association between inherent risk and audit fees.
Although auditor's risk assessments are proprietary, an important implication of these findings is that publicly available audit fees should contain information about the quality of a firm's accounting information. Therefore, after controlling for known determinants of audit fees, the unexplained portion should provide a summary measure of the auditor's proprietary assessment of the firm's accounting quality.
Another relevant branch of the auditing literature is the research examining the connection between fees for audit and non-audit services and auditor independence (e.g. Frankel et al. 2002; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Larcker and Richardson 2004) . These studies examine the contention that increasing fees for audit and non-audit services increases the economic bond between the auditor and client, thereby reducing auditor independence. As a result, earnings management will be associated with higher fees. Evidence supporting this theory is mixed. Frankel et al. (2002) document an association between non-audit fees and earnings management.
In contrast, studies by Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and Larker and Richardson (2004) find no support for the economic bonding hypothesis, using different methodologies.
The theoretical basis for our model of accounting quality contrasts with the notion that higher fees impair independence. We adopt a neoclassical perspective of the audit market, which assumes that auditors will increase fees to compensate for the additional risk from auditing firms with poor quality accounting systems. In essence, we reverse the direction of causality linking audit fees and accounting quality. Prior studies conjecture that impaired auditor independence resulting from higher fees leads to lower quality accounting information, while we argue that lower quality accounting systems result in higher fees charged by auditors.
Estimating Unexplained Audit Fees
To construct our measure of accounting quality, we first need to remove the variation in audit fees expected based on firm characteristics. Using prior literature we identify a set of determinants that are associated with audit fees (e.g., Simunic 1980; Larcker and Richardson 2004; and Hanlon and Krishnan 2006) . The determinants are intended to measure the resources required to complete the audit, with various proxies for size and complexity. We estimate the following model on a cross-sectional basis, by year: 
The variables are defined as follows: Our first measure of accounting quality (UAF) is estimated using the residual from equation (1) without including G-INDEX and BOARD_IND as independent variables. Our second measure of accounting quality (UAF_GOV) is estimated using the residual from the full model, which reduces the number of available observations.
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics
Sample composition and descriptive statistics
The data for our tests is taken from various sources. auditors, larger firms, more business segments, larger foreign operations, receivables, the presence of losses, and any non-standard opinion, and negatively associated with net income.
When board independence and the G-score are included, both are significantly associated with audit fees. The R 2 is quite high, averaging 74.68% for the model without governance, and 64.52% for the model that includes governance. Table 2 provides details on the characteristics of firms with high accounting quality (lowest UAF quintile) and low accounting quality (highest UAF quintile). The firms with estimated low quality accounting tend to be larger, both in terms of assets and sales, than the firms with high quality accounting. However, the direction of any bias is opposite from that of other measures, such as AQ, which tend to portray smaller firms as having lower quality earnings. 5 Profitability and leverage appear comparable between the highest and lowest accounting quality quintiles, with median ROA = 2% and Debt/Assets = 15% in the lowest quality quintile versus median ROA = 1% and Debt/Assets = 19% in the highest quality quintile.
Firms in the high accounting quality group also tend to be more 'value' firms than firms in the low accounting quality group, with median book-to-market of 0.48 versus 0.35. The patterns in panel B for UAF_GOV remain fairly stable, with a couple notable exceptions. First, firms in general tend to be larger because that BOARD_IND and G-SCORE are required, but the high accounting quality firms continue to be significantly smaller than the low accounting quality firms. Also, the difference between the book-to-market ratio across low and high quality groups formed using UAF_GOV is substantially smaller, averaging 0.53 for and 0.49 respectively. 
Comparing Unexplained Audit Fees to Other Measures of Earnings Quality
Accrual quality (AQ) is computed by taking the standard deviation of firm i's residuals, calculated over years t-4 through t. Consistent with UAF, larger values of AQ indicate lower earnings quality.
The other measures of earnings or accounting quality that we include are the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABS(DA)), estimated using the modified Jones model adjusted for performance (Kothari et al. 2005) ; absolute book-tax differences (BTD), measured as the log of the absolute value of deferred tax expense (data #50); and earnings smoothness (SMOOTH), measured as the ratio of the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items divided by the standard deviation of cash flow from operations (Leuz et al. 2003) . We also compute the standard deviation of operating cash flows over the past five years as a measure of innate operating volatility. This allows us to examine the extent to which each accounting quality measure correlates with operating volatility. All proxies for accounting quality are adjusted, if need be, so that larger values represent lower accounting quality. Table 3 presents the results comparing UAF to the other measures of earnings quality. sample, UAF_GOV is positively associated with smoothness and book-tax differences, but not accruals quality or absolute discretionary accruals. Taken together, the results in Table 3 suggest that our measure of accounting quality based on unexplained audit fees captures some of the information in the other measures of earnings quality, but also provides information that is not captured by the existing measures. Our next section examines the extent to which the new information in UAF captures accounting quality in two important settings.
IV. Validating Unexplained Audit Fees as a Measure of Accounting Quality
Our primary tests are intended to validate whether unexplained audit fees line up with settings that should be indicative of higher or lower accounting quality. To do so, we need to identify settings where, ex-post earnings are revealed to be higher or lower quality. Consistent with FASB's conceptual framework, which considers decision usefulness the primary criterion to guide accounting choice (Concepts Statement No. 2), we focus on two settings that capture the decision usefulness role of accounting information. First, we examine the ability of UAF to predict accounting restatements and accounting fraud, both unconditionally and in the presence of the AQ measure. Second, we examine whether stock returns capture more future earnings information when UAF signals high quality earnings. Because both settings provide ex-post indicators of earnings quality, they are suitable for validating ex-ante measures of quality, such as UAF, but not useful as measures of quality in and of themselves.
Restatements and Accounting Fraud
Restatements and fraud represent instances where firms provided misstated financial statements. We define restatements as any instance that financial statements are restated regardless of the reason for or severity of the restatement (RESTATEMENT), except for restatements due to clerical errors. As such, restatements tend to be broader, encompassing both fraudulent accounting and unintentional errors. In contrast, we also examine the most severe types of restatements, which encompass financial fraud, irregularities, and misrepresentations (FRAUD). Although instances of fraud are associated with more severe market consequences (e.g., Palmrose et al. 2004) , both intentional and unintentional errors distort the financial statements, thereby lowering decision usefulness, which is why we examine the full set of restatements. We also examine a third type of restatement, where the restatement is not identified explicitly as fraudulent, but triggers a regulatory investigation by either the SEC, PCAOB, or other governing body (INVESTIGATION). Data identifying restatements, fraud, and investigations are taken from Audit Analytics. We test the association between our proxy for accounting quality and the probability of firms having one of the three types of restatements using the following model: use of operating leases (OP LEASE); and the book to market ratio (BTM). Specific definitions are given in the notes to Table 4 . We also include the volatility of cash flows to control for innate operating volatility.
Results of estimating equation (3) are presented in Table 4 . Table 4 provide compelling evidence that good accounting quality measured using UAF is associated with lower instances of restatements and accounting fraud, conditional on a competing earnings quality measure and an extensive set of control variables.
Forward Earnings Response Coefficient
Our second setting examines the extent to which information in current returns captures information in future earnings. We test this association using the forward earnings response 
R t is the total annual stock return measured over the 12 month period ending three months after fiscal year t. E t-1 , E t , and E t+1 represent the net income for fiscal years t-1, t, and t+1, respectively, and all are scaled by the stock price at three months after the beginning of fiscal year t. E t-1 is included to function as an expectation for earnings in the current year and is included as a separate variable so that a specific form of the time-series process of earnings is not imposed (e.g., to impose a random walk E t-1 is subtracted from E t ). β 2 is the contemporaneous earnings response coefficient and is expected to be positive while β 1 is expected to be negative. 
R = + E + E + E + R + UAF + E *UAF + E *UAF + E *UAF + R *UAF + AQ + E *AQ
We expect that β 8 is negative indicating that UAF provides information that is incremental to AQ. Panel C provides the same analysis using AQ instead of UAF. In contrast to accounting quality measured using UAF, AQ shows no association with the market's ability to estimate future earnings information (β 8 = 0.06, t-stat= 0.24; β 8 =-1.00, t-stat=-1.32). Thus, unlike UAF, lower accruals quality measured using AQ is not associated with the extent to which market prices incorporate future earnings. Panel D presents the results when both UAF and AQ are included. Similar to the inferences in Panels B and C, the relation between future earnings and returns is only related to the audit-fee based measures of earnings quality. Overall, the results in Panels B through D suggest that firms with high UAF have significantly lower forward-earnings response coefficients, whereas AQ shows no association with the ability of the market to anticipate future earnings.
Association with Innate firm characteristics
Our final tests are designed to understand the extent to which UAF is associated with innate firm characteristics that could explain the association between UAF and other economic constructs. Past research has examined the role of accounting quality in various settings such as asset pricing, capital allocation, CEO reputation (e.g., Francis et al. 2005; Chen, Shevlin, Tong 2006; Biddle et al. 2008) . One of the greatest concerns researchers have when documenting these associations is that the proxy for earnings quality is capturing systematic firm characteristics that are unrelated to financial reporting, and it is these 'innate' characteristics that drive the association (i.e., correlated omitted variables). Although variables can be included in a regression to try to rule out correlated omitted variables, it is often unclear which variables to include, how many to include, or the correct specification. Therefore, an important aspect when developing a measure of accounting quality is not just the association with the unobservable construct of interest (i.e., accounting quality), but also the lack of association with other potentially confounding constructs (i.e., innate firm characteristics).
Recognizing the omitted variables bias is a source of endogeneity (i.e. correlation between the independent variable and the error term), an econometric concern that researchers should have when testing the effect of earnings quality is finding a good 'instrument', where the ideal instrument is correlated with the underlying construct of interest, but uncorrelated with the endogenous variables. Because the list of potentially omitted variables is limitless, we rely on documenting the association with known innate characteristics to provide the reader some assurance that UAF does not proxy for other obvious constructs that have been associated with other measures of quality.
Francis et al. (2005) dedicate a lot of their paper to separating discretionary AQ from innate AQ to alleviate these concerns. Following their model, we examine the extent to which a measure of accounting quality based on unexpected audit fees is likely to be confounded by firm characteristics. The innate characteristics that we examine as potentially confounding variables are the log of total assets (SIZE), the standard deviation of cash flows(σ CFO ) , the standard deviation of sales(σ SALES ) , natural log of the operating cycle, measured as the sum of days receivables and days inventory (log(OperCycle)), and the incidence of negative earnings over the past 10 years (NegEarn). Because we estimate UAF in a first-stage regression, many of these effects could be removed by including variables in the estimation stage. However, any variables included in the audit-fee model are there because of their theoretical association with expected audit fees, not because of a possible omitted variables problem.
7 Table 6 reports the association between UAF and innate firm characteristics. AQ is is explained by these factors. SIZE and NegEarn are still significant, as well as σ SALES in the UAF regression, and Log(OperCycle) in the UAF_GOV regression. However, the adjusted R 2 from these regressions drops dramatically, falling to only 1.75% for UAF and 0.56% for
UAF_GOV.
Figure 1 displays the adjusted R 2 for annual cross-sectional regressions of the quality measures on the innate characteristics, and shows that the patterns are intertermporally stable.
Although the explanatory power of the innate characteristics for AQ shows a slight increase over the seven-year horizon, when explaining UAF and UAF_GOV, the adjusted R 2 is consistently below 5%. Overall, the results in Table 6 and Figure 1 indicate that very little variation in the audit-fee based measures of accounting quality are captured by innate characteristics.
As a final examination of possible association with omitted variables, Figure 2 graphically displays the values of UAF and AQ, relative to percentiles of σ CFO , SIZE, and ROA.
Because the scaling of the quality measures differs, the left vertical axis displays the values of AQ, while the right vertical axis displays the values of UAF. This analysis reveals some interesting patterns. With respect to cash flow volatility in Panel A, AQ appears to be an increasing function of cash flow volatility, with high quality (low AQ) firms having very low cash flow volatility, and low quality firms (high AQ) having high cash flow volatility. In contrast, the association between UAF and cash flow volatility is not random, but appears to be "U" shaped. Thus, tests comparing high UAF firms to low UAF firms will likely hedge away differences in volatility, although a quadratic term could be inserted to control for the non-linear relation between σ CFO and UAF.
Panel B shows the association with size. Here again, AQ is a visibly decreasing function of size, indicating small firms tend to be characterized as having low quality earnings. In contrast, for much of the distribution (up to the 85 th percentile) there appears to be very little relation between SIZE and UAF. However, the very largest firms appear to also have higher unexplained audit fees. Note that this would imply a different relation between size and accounting quality, as the UAF measure would indicate that larger firms have lower quality accounting, on average. Thus, for many omitted variables, any size bias would work against finding a significant relation (e.g., cost of capital and accounting quality). Our robustness tests examine the effect of inserting a non-linear control for size, and yields the same inferences.
Finally, with respect to performance (ROA) in Panel C, both measures exhibit similar patterns. It appears the worst performers are associated with the lowest quality earnings, particularly below the 15 th percentile. However, for the rest of the distribution there appears to be no discernable pattern, and it is debatable whether the association with extreme negative performance is a problematic omitted variables issue, or simply showing that extreme negative earnings firms have poor earnings quality.
Robustness Tests
In addition to the tests shown in the tables, we conducted an number of robustness tests, to check the sensitivity of our results to different specifications. First, all the current tests use a continuous version of UAF as our measure of accounting quality. Because this is measured as a regression residual, there is the possible concern that extreme realization of the residual drive the results. To examine this, we re-estimate the tests using a ranked version of UAF, where the continuous variable is ranked into ten scaled deciles, ranging from zero to one. We reestimated the restatement regressions and the forward earnings-response coefficient tests using the decile ranked UAF instead of the continuous measure. In both settings, the decile ranked UAF measure continues to be statistically significant, and incrementally informative relative to AQ.
Our second robustness test examines the predictive ability of only the unique information contained in our quality measure. We examine two specifications here. First, we define discretionary UAF, simlar to Francis et al. (2005), which is the residual from regressing UAF on the innate firm characteristics described in Table 6 , and is therefore orthogonal to these factors.
Second, we examine the information UAF that is not contained in set of other earnings quality measures, by examining the residual of a regression of UAF on all other earnings quality measures, as in Table 3 , panel C. In both cases, the forward earnings response coefficient continues to be significantly negative, indicating that the information in UAF that is orthogonal to innate firm characteristics and to other earnings quality measures still captures differences in quality, measured with the FERC. For the restatement tests, the discretionary UAF that is orthogonal to innate firm characteristics is still predictive of fraud and regulatory investigations, but become insignificant with respect to the broader set of restatements.
Our third tests incorporates different functional forms into the audit fee equation with respect to size and cash flow volatility to control for the observed patterns in Figure 2 . In both the restatement and the FERC settings, there are no changes in the statistical inferences.
V. Conclusion
Several empirical measures have been developed in the literature to assess financial reporting quality. Most measures focus on financial statement realizations, and are intended to capture earnings quality. In this paper, we introduce a new measure of accounting quality.
Although our measure captures aspects of earnings quality, it is intended to be a broader measure of the overall quality of the accounting system, and is not based on realized earnings. Instead, we infer the auditor's assessment of the accounting quality from unexpected audit fees, using the rationale that auditors will charge a premium to audit clients with low quality accounting systems.
We show that our measure of accounting quality is positively correlated with other measures of earnings quality used in the literature, but also contains unique information. When benchmarked against Dechow and Dichev's (2002) accruals quality measure, we find that UAF is incrementally informative for predicting restatements and regulatory investigations.
Moreover, our measure of unexplained audit fees is predictive of accounting fraud, and is associated with the market's ability to anticipate future earnings, whereas the accruals quality (data3) divided by average total assets (data6). REC is accounts receivable (data2) divided by average total assets (data6). DEBT is long-term (data9) plus short-term debt (data34) divided by average total assets (data6). ROA represents return on assets and is defined as operating income after depreciation (data178) divided by average total assets (data6). LOSS is a indicator variable equal to one if net income before extraordinary items is negative in any of prior three years (year t, t-1, and t-2), and zero otherwise. AUD OPIN is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a firm receives anything other than a standard unqualified opinion (data149), and zero otherwise. BIG4 is a indicator variables that is equal to one if the firm's auditor is a member of the Big 4 (or Big 5 before the exit of Arthur Andersen), and zero otherwise (data149). BUS SEG is the square root of the number of business segments of the firm as defined by Compustat segment file. BOARD_IND is measured as the ratio of independent directors to total directors. G-INDEX is a measure of firms' corporate governance from Gompers et al. (2003) . IND represents industry indicator variables. Asterisks *, **, and *** denote two-tailed (one-tailed when there is a predicted sign) statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentile except for indicator variables.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for included variables
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Table 2 Comparison of Firms in Bottom and Top Quartile of UAF Distribution
This table presents a comparison of financial variables for firms in the bottom and top quartiles of the distribution of UAF (Panel A) and UAF_GOV (Panel B). UAF (UAF_GOV) is calculated as the residual from annual cross-sectional regressions of the audit fee model without (with) governance variables included in the model. Assets and sales are the total assets (data6) and sales revenue (data12), respectively. ROA represents return on assets and is defined as operating income after depreciation (data178) divided by average total assets (data6). LEV is long-term (data9) plus short-term debt (data34) divided by average total assets (data6). BTM is the book to market ratio calculated as book value of equity (data60) divided by market value (data25*data199). All variables are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentile. 
Table 3 Association between Unexplained Audit Fees and Other Meaures of Accounting Quality
This table compares unexplained audit fees to other measures of earnings quality. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the various proxies of accounting quality. Panel B presents the Pearson (top) and Spearman (bottom) correlation coefficients and bolded amounts represent significance at .05 or less. Panel C and D present the results from regressions of UAF and UAF_GOV, respectively, on variables representing accounting quality proxies. UAF (UAF_GOV) is calculated as the residual from annual cross-sectional regressions of the audit fee model without (with) governance variables included in the model. AQ is the standard deviation of firm i's residuals from a regression of current accruals on lag, current, and future cash flows from operations. ABS(DA) is the absolute value of discretionary accruals from the performance-adjusted modified cross-sectional Jones model. SMOOTH is the ratio of firms i's standard deviation of earnings before extraordinary items (scaled by total assets) to the standard deviation of cash flows from operations (scaled by total assets). BTD is the log of the absolute value of the deferred tax expense. σ CFO is the standard deviation of the firm's rolling ten-year cash flow from operations. All regression variables are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentile. The t-statistics are White adjusted. Asterisks *, **, and *** denote two-tailed (one-tailed when there is a predicted sign) statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Table 4 Association between Unexplained Audit Fees and Restatements
This table examines if unexplained audit fees are predictive of accounting restatements and fraud in the year of the transgression. Panel A documents the frequency of restatements, frauds and regulatory investigations by year. Panel B presents the Pearson (top) and Spearman (bottom) correlation coefficients and bolded amounts represent significance at .05 or less. Panels C through D examine logisitic regressions predicting restatements, both conditionally and unconditionally, with varying levels of controls. RESTATEMENTi,t is an indicator variable that is equal to one if firm i's fiscal year t financial restatements are consequently restated, and zero otherwise. FRAUD is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the restatement is the result of fraud, and zero otherwise. INVESTIGATION is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the restatement triggered an investigation by a regulatory body (e.g., SEC, PCAOB), and zero otherwise. UAF (UAF_GOV) is calculated as the residual from annual cross-sectional regressions of the audit fee model without (with) governance variables included in the model. AQ is the standard deviation of firm i's residuals from a regression of current accruals on lag, current, and future cash flows from operations. σ CFO is the standard deviation of the firm's rolling five-year cash flow from operations. RSST accruals are the accrual accounts (ΔWC + ΔNCO + ΔFIN) from Richardson et al. (2006) where:
. ΔREC is the change in receivables (data2) divided by average total assets. ΔINV is the change in inventory (data3) divided by average total assets. ΔCASH SALES is the percentage change in cash sales where cash sales is calculated as sales (data12) minus ΔREC. ΔNIBE is the change in ROA where ROA is defined as net income before extraordinary items (data18) divided by average total assets. ISSUANCE is a indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm issued securities during the year (data108 > 0 or data111 > 0), and zero otherwise. ΔEMPLOYEES is the abnormal change in employees and is defined as the percentage change in the number of employees (data29) minus the percentage change in total assets (data6). OPERATING LEASE is a indicator variable that is equal to one when the firm has an operating lease (data95 > 0). BTM is the book to market ratio calculated as book value of equity (data60) divided by market value (data25*data199 is the annual stock return for year t, measured over the 12-month period ending three months after the firm's fiscal year end. E i,t-1 , E i,t , and E i,t+1 are the income available to common shareholders before extraordinary items for the year t-1, t, and t+1, respectively, and all are deflated by the market value of equity three months after the year t-1 fiscal year end. UAF (UAF_GOV) is calculated as the residual from annual cross-sectional regressions of the audit fee model without (with) governance variables included in the model. AQ is the standard deviation of firm i's residuals from a regression of current accruals on lag, current, and future cash flows from operations. The t-statistics are White adjusted. Asterisks *, **, and *** denote two-tailed (one-tailed when there is a predicted sign) statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. All regression variables are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentile.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Table 6. The association between Unexplained Audit Fees and Innate Firm Characteristics
This table examines the extent to which unexplained audit fees are confounded by innate firm characteristics. Panel A provides descriptive statistics for UAF and AQ, as well as several firm characteristics. Panel B presents the mean results of annual regressions of accounting quality measures on innate firm characteristics. t-statistics are calculated based on the standard errors of the seven annual coefficient estimates. SIZE is the log of total assets; σ(CFO) is the standard deviation of cash flow from operations; σ(SALES) is the standard deviation of sales; Log(OperCycle) is the log of operating cycle; NegEarn is the incidence of negative earnings over the past 10 years. Asterisks *, **, and *** denote two-tailed (one-tailed when there is a predicted sign) statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. All regression variables are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentile. SIZE is the log of total assets; σ(CFO) is the standard deviation of cash flow from operations; σ(SALES) is the standard deviation of sales; Log(OperCycle) is the log of operating cycle; NegEarn is the incidence of negative earnings over the past 10 years. Asterisks *, **, and *** denote two-tailed (one-tailed when there is a predicted sign) statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. All regression variables are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentile.
Figure 1 Accounting Quality and Innate Characteristics
This Figure portrays adjusted R-squared values for annual regressions of three alternative accounting quality measures on the following innate firm characteristics: SIZE, which is the log of total assets; σ(CFO), which is the standard deviation of cash flow from operations; σ(SALES), which is the standard deviation of sales; Log(OperCycle), which is the log of operating cycle; and NegEarn, which is the incidence of negative earnings over the past 10 years. 
